There is a prevalent assumption that the fact that a mental experience has a phenomenal property is an ontological fact and that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is an epistemological problem. Contrary to this assumption, the paper argues that the claim that mental experience gives rise to phenomenal property is an assertion about the world, which is yet to be adequately justified. Justifying this assertion is identified as the further problem of the hard problem of consciousness. This shows that assertions about phenomenal properties of mental experiences are wholly epistemological. Hence, the problem of explaining phenomenal properties of a mental state is not a metaphysical problem, and what is considered a hard problem of consciousness is due to human reasoning process rather than an ontological process. Key words; Consciousness, what is it like to be, phenomenal property, mental experience, raw feels, qualia.

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