Introduction

Throughout the Pacific, the sea is a complex property construct which is imbued with indigenous identity, myths, customary marine tenure systems, and associated sustainable management practices. these co-exist with the colonial subjugation of these ownership practices; the imposition of unfamiliar property regimes; the cultural and identity practices of new coastal residents; and, in the case of New Zealand, the strongly expressed, and stridently defended ideology, that coastal spaces are public property. As a property complex, the sea has relatively unique characteristics. It is, for example, four-dimensional having length, breadth, depth, and mobility (Keary 1990 as cited in Phyne 1997). these dimensions provide a multiplicity of potential use rights, claims to ownership, and relationships between rights holders. In this article, I concentrate on property rights and relations in fisheries. I do this by examining the impact of fisheries regulations on the lives of the residents of Leigh, a small New Zealand fishing community.

Neither property constructs nor the ideology governing them are necessarily inherently consistent (benda-beckman et al. 2006). Particularly, this may be the case in colonial settler states where there has been an historic struggle over attempts to alienate indigenous land (including coastal property) and resources, predominantly through the imposition of private property regimes and simultaneous-if highly complicated-attempts to accommodate indigenous common property tenure systems. these strains are occasioned by the capitalist tendency to commodify an increasing number of objects and to generalize individual property systems. these forces are historically constitutive of present fisheries regulations in New Zealand and have created an uneasy amalgamation: a property construct informed by competing and frequently contradictory ownership ideologies based on private, common, and public property. commercial regulations are directed toward the creation of private property, whereas customary regulations have their origin in conceptions of common property, and, to an important degree, recreational regulations rest on the notion of open access.

Changes in the constellation of property relationships fundamentally influence issues of identity, social structure, and work organization. Privatization and commodification have the potential to distort relations of ownership between people, as well as between people and things, depriving them of their social and cultural significance. transformations in property regimes affect not only mechanisms of production, distribution, and exchange but also social and cultural relations, symbolic and ideological structures, and the ongoing constitution and reconstitution of group identities (Hann 1998). changes in legislation create new arenas of conflict over property rights. In Leigh, this struggle has internal and external dimensions; on the one hand, it manifests itself as conflict between community members and various categories of outsiders and, on the other hand, the changes create a new set of conditions which heighten competition between local users of marine resources. In the case of the latter, there are, however, countervailing tendencies which tend to keep potential conflicts in check.

This article is divided into four sections. the first section outlines the new legal institutions which govern fishing in New Zealand. the second describes the research site. the third examines the system of social relations and practices embedded in the practice of fishing. the final section considers the ideology which informed the recent changes and contrasts this to everyday experience. these sections draw on the analytical framework developed by legal anthropologists, Franz and Keebet von bendabeckmann (1999, 2006). their model identifies four distinct levels or layers of property in social organization: legal, social relationships, social practices, and ideological (although, in practice, each intersects with the others in a multitude of ways). At the legal level, property relationships construct categories of owners and objects, together with the associated rights and obligations. At the social relationships layer, property is expressed through relations between property holders (and between property holders and non-property holders) in respect to concrete things in a process characterized by ongoing negotiation and struggle. At the analytical level of practices, property ideologies, concrete social relationships, and categorical property relations all play a part. these factors serve variously to constrain and enable action. At the ideological level, property relations in contemporary society tend to have multiple interpretations. Each particular ideology has a distinctive mode of representation and method by which preferred or already existing property relations are rationalized.

Fisheries Management in New Zealand: The Legal Level

At the legal level, fishing in New Zealand comprises three sectors: commercial, recreational, and customary. this provides the broad legislative framework under which all three sectors are governed; however, each is also subject to regulations specific to that sector. Each sector is considered formally distinct by the Ministry of Fisheries, a conception reinforced by an absence of legislative overlap and a rigid application of delineating criteria. these three sectors define a space within which struggles over property rights, broadly considered, are expressed. Further, the interrelations between the three sectors are sometimes fraught as competing interests seek to establish a primacy of claims. At the level of concrete practice however, these discrete categories may be viewed as both abstract and artificial by fishers; indeed it is sometimes difficult to draw distinctions between them, and, in everyday transactions the delineating boundaries are somewhat blurred. Maori customary fishers, for instance, might simultaneously fish for a "daily feed" as well as for ceremonial purposes (the former falls under recreational and the latter under customary regulations). commercial fishers, in order to "catch a feed," are required to comply with recreational legislation, but they may also double as charter boat operators and thus participate in the recreational sector. In addition, commercial fishers may catch fish for ceremonial occasions under customary regulations.

Commerical Regulations

The commodification of fishing rights that accompanies tradable permit systems creates a distinction between the sea and its fish, treating them as objectively separate phenomena. Individual transferable Quotas (ItQs) are a single species approach to fisheries management and give quota holders a private right to harvest fish from a given stock. conversely, conceptions of ownership in coastal communities typically link both the sea and fishing access in the same property construct in which kinship and/ or longevity of residence structures the right to resources. the separation of fishing rights from their embedded seascapes undermines the social practices and beliefs integral to the reproduction of fishing as a way of life (see carothers 2008).

In 1986, New Zealand set in place a new management system for commercial fishing by way of Individual transferable Quotas (ItQs). this signaled a transition from a regime characterized by central regulation to one based on free-market principles. Its implementation phase was accompanied by the removal of part-time fishers from the industry, however, since then the system has been extended and comprehensively modified. these modifications ostensibly serve three purposes: first, to bring greater clarity to the nature of the particular private property right involved; second, to promote economic efficiency (the total value of quota in 2009 was estimated at $4 billion, a growth of 47 percent since 1996 [statistics New Zealand 2009]); and third, to ensure fish stock sustainability. the Quota Management system (QMs) in New Zealand is thought by some observers to represent the most extensive "and perhaps most robust example of ItQ-management in the world today" (connor 2001:1).

ItQs were created as a perpetual right to a part of the fish harvest, designated in absolute weights of whole fish (in metric tons) for a particular species or species group, to be taken annually from a specified fishing ground (a Quota Management Area). they allocate to an individual operator or a company an exclusive share of the total allowable catch (a catch limit set for a particular fishery on a yearly basis) (Dewees 2008:36), which since 1990 has been calculated as a percentage of the total allowable catch (tAc) rather than as a specific tonnage. ItQs are essentially a private property in the right to harvest fish from a given stock. An individual or company may participate in the QMs as a quota owner, lessee, lessor, or some combination of the three (stewart, Walshe, and Moodie 2005). Quota holders may buy and sell quota as they wish and there is no limit on the number of times that quota can be sold (Lock and Leslie 2007). Quota is also divisible and additive, so individuals can trade part of their quota or sell it as a package. In addition, quota owners can sell their current harvesting entitlement (Annual catch Entitlement, AcE) while retaining their long-term-ownership in the fishery.1

Several developments of significance to Maori commercial fisheries have been implemented in the last few decades. these include a settlement of Maori treaty2 claims to fisheries in 1992 resulting in a major shift of quota rights to Maori communities and the separation of Maori commercial from customary fishing rights; the development of Customary Fisheries Regulations, 1998; the provision in the Fisheries Act, 1996 for the participation of Maori leaders in decisions concerning sustainability; and the requirement that policy decisions in general be consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act, 1992. the Maori Fisheries Act, 2004 established a framework for both the allocation of commercial settlement assets to iwi (tribal) bodies and the management of these assets.

Overall, the major modifications to the QMs, including the changes impacting Maori interests specifically, have been driven by neoliberal policy imperatives. this is apparent in the progressive removal of the government's regulatory responsibilities, the increasing onus on industry players to fund research, the insistence that individualized property rights are a prerequisite for both economic efficiency and sustainable management, and the reliance on an "unregulated" market to allocate valued resources.

Customary Regulations

Maori non-commercial fisheries are governed by the Customary Fishing Regulations, 1998 and section 186A of the Fisheries Act, 1996. Where the former regulations have not yet been implemented, regulation 27A of the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing Regulations) Act, 1986 continues to hold sway.

In order to activate the tools available under customary regulations, Maori must first declare a rohe moana (territorial sea space). Once this declaration is validated by various community and official bodies, Maori may establish a mataitai (saltwater) reserve in their coastal territory. such reserves designate food-gathering areas of customary importance and the Minister of Fisheries may authorize local management to administer non-commercial harvesting in these areas. regulation 16 allows for the preparation of a management plan or strategy which may then be treated as a planning document under legislation governing resource management. section 186A of the Fisheries Act, 1996 applies to areas outside of mataitai reserves and provides a method for Maori to apply for Ministerial recognition of hitherto "voluntary" rahui (a temporary prohibition/restriction on fishing imposed by Maori). In addition, the Fisheries Act, 1996 enables the establishment of taiapure (coastal waters of special significance to Maori as sources of food or cultural identity) and Maori can recommend fishing controls within an area so designated.

Under Customary Fishing Regulations, 1998 customary fishing is defined as non-commercial and devoid of activities associated with pecuniary gain or trade. customary fishing is thus essentially limited to the harvesting of seafood for ceremonial occasions, specifically hui (gathering/ meetings) and tangi (funerals). the regulations provide for tangata whenua ("people of the land"/indigenous) groups to appoint kaitiaki (resource managers) whose appointments require the subsequent approval of the Ministry of Fisheries. Approved kaitiaki are the only people who can permit customary fishing in their tribal area. In order to enable customary fishing, kaitiaki must first prepare a written authorization document which specifies the following: the date(s) when fishing is to occur; who will take the fish; quantity and size limit of each species to be caught; the fishing method for each species; the area where fishing is to occur; the purpose and venue for which the fish are needed; and other information such as what to do with bycatch. these permits must be made available to Fisheries Officers upon request and kaitiaki are required to report to the Ministry of Fisheries on a regular basis the quantities of fish authorized. these provisions allow for customary take to be included in the QMs regime. In 2010, approximately 4,800 tons of customary take was provided for in the tAc (Ministry of Fisheries 2010).

Taken together, these regulations supposedly mimic traditional Maori fishing practices, including the delineation of coastal tribal territories. However, this is a contentious assumption.

Recreational Regulations

New Zealand coastal waters are divided into Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs), each with specific rules. For instance, Leigh (the research site) is within FMA1, the Auckland and Kermadec Fisheries Management Area. Here, recreational fishers may catch up to 20 finfish a day in addition to other species. Minimum size limits and method restrictions apply to most species of fish. regulations are broadly similar in the central FMA and the challenger FMA. In the south East, southland, and Fiordland FMAs fishers, may catch up to 30 finfish a day. While recreational fishers can fish in any FMA in New Zealand, they are obliged to abide by the set of rules specific to each area.

Recreational fishing allowances, like customary fishing allowances, are determined by the tAc. the potential harvest available to recreational and customary fishers is set before the remainder is allocated to commercial quota owners. However, recreational fishers are neither required to hold licenses nor to report the amount of daily catches. For this reason, it is hard to ascertain the fishing effort of this category and to determine their overall impact on fish stocks for sustainable management purposes. the Ministry of Fisheries judges that 19.5 percent of the general New Zealand population participate in recreational fishing, and take an estimated 25,000 tons per annum. In comparison, the commercial catch in 2010 was calculated at 409,449 tons (Ministry of Fisheries 2010).

Leigh: A Fishing Community

The ethnographic material for this article is drawn from research conducted in 2007 in Leigh, a small and picturesque fishing community overlooking a harbor, composed of approximately 400 residents, and located roughly 90 kilometers north of Auckland.3 this research combined participant observation and in-depth interviews with representatives from the commercial, customary, and recreational sectors. 19 fishers (ten commercial, three customary, and six recreational) were formally interviewed and many more community members participated on a more informal basis.

Leigh has facilities similar to those of other small rural communities in New Zealand such as a school, a pre-school, and fire station. the average age of people in Leigh lies in the mid-40s, a decade older than the New Zealand norm, and correspondingly there is a higher than average number of retirement age residents and a lower than average number in the 15 to 29 age group. the ethnic composition in Leigh (79.8 percent European, 17.7 percent Maori, 4.0 percent Pacific Islanders, 3.2 percent Asian, and 12.1 percent Other)4 approximately resembles the New Zealand norm, though Europeans are marginally overrepresented (statistics New Zealand 2006). socioeconomic indicators for Leigh vary between six and seven, with ten signifying the highest degree of deprivation (NZDep 2006). Over the last decade there has been a major decrease in agricultural and fisheries related work coinciding with an increase in employment in the accommodation industry and property services. Given these changes, the designation of Leigh as a fishing community is contestable and at variance with its more contemporary and allegedly more economically viable aspirations. there have been recent initiatives by the District council and business interests to rebrand "Leigh by the sea" and surrounding areas as a tourist and lifestyle Mecca. this new description, although resisted by local fishers, rests on the real and recent proliferation of wineries, various organic and delicatessen styled restaurants, an upmarket farmers' market, boutique lodging facilities, and the availability of a diverse range of maritime leisure activities. Within this conception, fishing-with its associated material culture-becomes a potential tourist attraction, although the somewhat idealized image presented to outsiders obscures the actual struggle involved in maintaining fishing activity as a way of life.

Despite these contradictory forces, a community of fishers still operates from Leigh. Many of the residents of Leigh have interests in fishing for various and often combined reasons, such as for their economic livelihoods, to supplement their diets, and (in the case of Maori) to fulfill customary obligations. there are, three institutions which ostensively serve to reinforce the fishing characteristic of the community: a marine laboratory (a research facility opened by the University of Auckland in 1964), Goat Island Marine reserve, and a fish processing operation (see below). the reserve attracts international interest from scientists eager to conduct research and tourists keen to swim with fish, snorkel, or observe the underwater world through glass-bottomed boats. Of the 375,000 visitors to the reserve in 2007, only 7 percent were local residents (Hunt 2008). Participants in my research commonly expressed a sense of alienation from the perceived commercial and recreational benefits of the reserve:

From a fisherman's point of view we can't see any benefit closing that much coastline to crayfishing. From a community member's point of view it has brought in probably three or four fold more vehicles...I love Goat Island, but I wish it was at Helensville or at bay of Islands because then these people would drive away.

Leigh's commercial fishers are long liners and primarily target snapper (Pagrus auratus). In the majority of cases, fishers own their own boats, small vessels between 10 and 14 meters. they lease Annual catch Entitlements (AcE) from, and subsequently sell their catches to, the local fish processing company, Leigh Fisheries, an export company specializing in chilled, high-value fish products. Many research participants considered the company to be locally oriented, mainly because it provides long-term employment to about 20 percent of the community and is the largest and most stable employer in the area. It also contributes funds to schools and sports clubs, and is perceived as generously supportive of local institutions. Nevertheless, community endorsement is somewhat qualified by anxieties about the future. Perhaps because of its centrality to the economic welfare of the area, concern is often expressed about the continuing viability of the company in Leigh given its commercial growth and success, the relative dearth of small independent companies in the industry, and its susceptibility to absorption by a larger processing company. Leigh Fisheries occupies a relatively small physical space in the town and while it is conceptualized ostensibly as a local institution, the company is simultaneously deeply enmeshed in global market systems and forces. 5 the company is owned by 33 non-local private shareholders and the product is designated for the quality end of export markets. According to Duncan, this is not altogether surprising since quotas are typically linked to global markets and the fish stocks under most pressure are invariably harvested for these lucrative overseas markets (1994:31). Indeed, more than 90 percent of all commercial fish landed in New Zealand is exported (Ministry of Fisheries n.d.).

Social Practices and Social Relations

The ten commercial fishers who participated in this research had spent an average of two decades in the industry and tended to have started young, often beginning as deck hands when they were about 14 years old. the fishers considered their work to be much more than the pursuit of a livelihood; rather, it was viewed as a way of life.

Joe: It's what I've done all my life. I don't really know anything else.

Jim: Got no complaints about the fishing. I love it...being on the boat, when I leave the wharf and the world goes away and I can do my thing out there in my own little world and my day happens and I go through the night and the next day you come back into cell phone range and all hell breaks...when I go fishing I shut the door it's great.

Paul: the ones that are left are the true fishermen because they're not doing it for money, they're doing it because that's what they are, that's what they love doing and the guys that got in it to make money are all well gone by the wayside. It's a lifestyle, it's a good lifestyle, it's a healthy lifestyle, you're part of the real world, real people

Cross-cultural research suggests that this is a common sentiment among fishers. McGoodwin (1990) points to the pride inherent in identifying as a fisher, a pride found in virtually every study of fishing communities. All participant fishers expressed a deep sense of foreboding that this way of life was under attack from forces that were outside their control, a threat made explicit by the dramatic decline of commercial fishers in Leigh in recent years-from around 29 boat owners in 2000/2001 to approximately ten in 2007. this decrease coincided with a marked drop in income over the last decade. As two owners said, "I used to make more as a crew when I was 18 than I do now" and "I need to get another job to support my fishing habit." And a third, Joe, said:

A few years ago I had seven people working for me but I'm down to two part-time crew now. A lot of them won't stay because the money has got so bad that there's not enough wages for them.

Fishers consistently traced the current precariousness of their livelihood to two main consequences of the QMs: quota consolidation and the ownership of quota by non-fishers. both factors explicitly undermine any claims to ownership that fishers have over their productive activities.

The ownership of quota is an overriding consideration in the lives of commercial fishers in Leigh. Indeed, a potentially controversial aspect of ItQ systems, and tradable permit systems in general, is concerned with the way in which the wealth of the resource is allocated (tietenberg 2002). None of the participant commercial fishers received quota during the initial allocation rounds in 1986. there are a variety of reasons for this: many of the fishers were too young at the time; others, although they had fished for a few years prior to the introduction of the QMs, had not built up the requisite catch history to qualify; a few were deckhands-a group that were not allocated any quota; and a number of fishers commented that although their fathers had received an allocation parcel this had either been insufficient to support commercial fishing or they had short-sightedly sold the quota. Of the participant commercial fishers, one had inherited quota, six had purchased quota at the market rate, and three owned no quota. None of the seven quota owning fishers possessed the amount of quota needed to make a living from fishing. One fisher owned most of his quota, one owned one third, and the rest owned only a small amount. Fishers leased the rest of their quota, predominantly from Leigh Fisheries. Many had sold quota over the preceding years in order to remain financially afloat.

Differential quota ownership in Leigh has become a source of heightened competitiveness and internal conflict. Fishers commented on the loss of amity and solidarity; one participant commented: "It's more cut- throat...people get their nose out of joint with some people getting more quota than other people and it's created an atmosphere like it never used to be." the recent closure of a local pub, a central meeting place for fishers, is seen by sam as symptomatic of the decline in sociability:

Everyone is struggling quite hard. It used to be quite humorous...you used to be able to have a laugh and "go yeah the sharks chopped up half your gear," it was all good but after the quota came in things have become so much more expensive. the price of gear has gone up, the return for the fish has gone down. Most people would be lucky to get $5 a kilo for fish. It's pretty shocking. then you see it in the shop $20 a kilo and everybody is going "oh, you must be doing pretty good" but there's so many middle men taking their cuts.

Robert shares a similar sentiment:

I'm sick of hitting my head against the wall, getting fed lies from the [Ministry of] Fisheries. It's getting harder, how much cost cutting do we do before somebody loses a life? It's pretty much like that. I grew up in Leigh walking around the rocks and always wanted to go fishing and when dad came in on the weekends you'd be going to the wharf, helping him on the boat and rowing the dinghy around, filching his cigarettes and going round the rocks and having a smoke or going surf casting and there was a group of us we always used to hang out together, it was great. that's just not there anymore. things have changed.

However, internal cohesion is encouraged through participation in a local commercial fishers organization which provides a forum for discussion and advocacy. "Its an association of fishermen that fish in Leigh, we try and stick up for our rights and stick together, if you're on your own you've ot no power at all and as a group we might have a whisper."

The way in which fish is purchased has implications for concentration in the industry. Non-quota owning fishers must purchase AcE in order to fish. Fishers must also sell fish to Licensed Fish receivers (LFrs). If AcE is purchased from processing companies (which are also LFrs), fishers are usually required by contract to sell their catch to these companies, at prices set by the processing companies. Leigh Fisheries is an LFr, although it differs to a certain extent from the typical fish processing company in that it is relatively small, independently structured, situated within a community with a comparatively minor port, and does not own its own boats. the company instead makes contracts with boats that fish on its behalf. All participant commercial fishers currently fish for, or had recently fished for, Leigh Fisheries. Further, Leigh Fisheries is both a quota owner and an LFr, and thus benefits from both selling AcE and processing the fish that are landed under that AcE:

Joe: they [Leigh Fisheries]...used to...sell the fish on behalf of us and now they sell the fish on behalf of them and give us a flat rate... Leigh Fisheries went from a co-op to a company.

Paul: ...they [Leigh Fisheries] own all the quota...they're getting an extra percentage of this here, there, and everywhere and screwing us until there's nothing left. I lost my house, lost one of my boats, everything because of the sudden cut.

Michael: At Leigh Fisheries we used to have social things, we don't now, we're outcast now to my way of thinking. I do still fish for Leigh Fisheries, I have no option, I can't do anything else. No-one else has got the quota, we're caught.

Joe: ...most of their fish comes in from elsewhere. It used to be a community fishery but most of the fishing boats have been phased out. they've all been basically wiped out by different things, you know no quota, extra costs coming in, and the fish price is going down.

Perhaps, the most keenly felt source of antagonism towards the QMs among commercial fishers flows from one of the perceived consequences of the system, that is, the ownership of quota by non-fishers.

Joe: I feel that if you own quota you should fish it yourself, it should not be people controlling other people's livelihood who have nothing to do with fishing, because they don't care about the environment or anything like that you know...people like lawyers and accountants that go and buy quota as a business to lease out, they shouldn't be allowed to...they see it as a share market.6

Peter: ...the bulk of the profit on paua (abalone) went to the quota owner...paua quota owners got very rich very quickly and still are. their quota was valuable plus the actual fish were valuable to sell and only perhaps 12 percent of the value of the catch went to paying the diver to catch it, transport it, and deliver it to the factory, etc. so with some species like paua the quota owners that weren't fishing have done very well out of it and they haven't been particularly fair in sharing out the value of that return to the divers.

Peter: ...It is unfair because it is so expensive. I think if fishermen only could own quota it would stop the speculative market and keep the value of quota quite suppressed but it would also mean that fishermen themselves were actually making some money...fishing is part of our life and we're now stuck on a price and aren't making much out of the daily catch, can't afford a new boat, can't afford to buy quota at the speculator price, and can't easily borrow the money... not making a lot of profit but still want to be fishermen.

Michael: I think it is getting to the stage now anyway that there's more quota holders than there is fishermen, eventually it is going to be who's going to go out there and catch it, going to bring in foreign crews, get the russians to catch it or something.

Fishers pitted an environmental ethos against the "business" agenda of quota owners, arguing that they themselves are inclined to practice an informally sanctioned and self-regulated form of sustainable management. this discourse rested on an identity constructed from being a "local" fisher. None of the commercial fishers in Leigh are tangata whenua (indigenous to Leigh). One (a deckhand) is Maori from elsewhere in New Zealand and the remainder are New Zealand Europeans. Participants, nevertheless, articulated their attachment to place through kinship ties. Most are second or third generation fishers. In the case of one participant, fishing had been a family tradition for over a century. "to be on the sea, my dad's father, my grandfather he was a net maker and a boat builder, I'd like to keep another generation going. My little girl, Erin, she comes out, we go scalloping and she loves the sea...we've got the sea right on our doorstep, it's like paradise for someone like me who's a fisherman."

The relations between commercial fishers and other fishing sectors are somewhat fraught. Although it is strongly asserted that local recreational fishers are "entitled to catch a feed" this sentiment is not extended to outside recreational fishers. such fishers are perceived to be in direct competition with commercial fishers. the increasing sophistication of boats and equipment used by recreational fishers means that they can hunt in areas previously considered the reserve of commercial fishers. tensions are focused on shared areas such as the wharf where there is limited room, and near-shore fishing grounds. A participant remarked, "the charter boats have sort of taken over...it's us against them." Fisheries legislation is also viewed as biased in favor of recreational fishers. In particular, there is resentment that these fishers do not have to pay levies or other fishery- related charges. As Michael stated,

They don't need a license...the charter operators you talk to, you see them wheeling their chilly bins [coolers] and chilly bins and chilly bins of fish that they're paying no AcE for, they're not paying any quota or anything like that yet they make a living from catching fish exactly the same as what I do so there's inconsistencies in the way the rules are applied.

The dearth of Maori commercial fishers in Leigh is due to a number of factors, not least, the introduction of the QMs. this was accompanied by a new definition of commercial fisher which effectively excluded part- time and, in particular, shore and vessel Maori fishers (Fairgray 1985, Habib 1985). Participants noted that Maori who fished commercially in Leigh have disappeared in the last three decades as "some of their boats have been sold, some of them have finished, some of them have moved on." the high cost of entering the quota market is a major factor inhibiting new entrants.

As noted above, the settlement of Maori claims to commercial fisheries resulted in a substantial amount of quota being shifted to Maori iwi. However, this redistribution does not always filter down to local levels. transferability is a defining characteristic of quota. the option to lease quota to large (including Maori owned) companies is being taken up by many iwi such that quota has become more or less synonymous with an investment good as opposed to a tool that enables individual Maori fishers to partake in commercial fishing (Mccormack 2010). At the time of my research, participant Maori had not received any quota or other financial benefits from this settlement. For instance, "I understand that they [the iwi] give it [quota] to a fishing company, all our people need to do is go to that fishing company and lease the quota. that costs money." Another participant was more critical of the commercial settlement "We got some information...but what happens to the money?...typical Maori money, only goes to two or three people, not the rest of the tribe."

Customary Fishers

Maori fishing in Leigh is largely confined to either the recreational or customary domains. With regard to the customary fisheries sector, the two resident hapu (sub-tribes) are in the process of establishing customary Fisheries regulations under the 1998 Act. both groups are finding the process rather arduous. the difficulty is exaggerated by a lack of governmental financial support for either the implementation or practice of customary tools. Harvesting for ceremonial occasions is most often carried out by an accommodating commercial operator who is issued with the necessary permit by a local kaitiaki. At present, in order to catch a "daily feed," Maori fish under the recreational regulations.

Approximately 50 Maori who are tangata whenua reside in the area. this relatively small number is a consequence of out-migration in search of economic opportunities elsewhere. Many if not most of these migrants return home during the holiday periods (approximately 150 people). All permanent residents gather kaimoana (seafood) on a regular basis and those returning for weekends and holidays maintain a tangata whenua status and frequently fish. Fish is highly valued as a source of identity production: "that's the nature of our people and it is bred into us that we're a fishing people. We lived on the sea, most of our food came from the sea." seafood is important as a subsistence item: "today our diet would probably consist of four days a week on fish, most of our people would eat fish rather than something from the land." the subsistence value has gained a heightened importance in recent times "mainly because of not a lot of work in the local community, other than fishing...not a lot of big farms left, so people either go away or the ones that are here have to live off the sea."

Under current legislation this type of fishing, despite its essentially subsistence character, is nonetheless categorized as recreational fishing. Maori fishers, however, make a distinction between themselves and other recreational fishers. As one participant explained it,

We fish for kai (food), for enough kai, recreationals fish for fun and a bit of kai, but quite often you get the case where the recreational fisherman, he might go out and catch a bin full before he's happy but a bin full could be 20 different fish and he might say, "no I've got plenty of snapper" or whatever he feels he likes and will chuck the rest overboard...or use the kahawai (a large game fish) for bait. With the customary fishermen like ourselves, the tangata whenua, whether we catch kahawai or a snapper or flounder or hapuka or trevally or cod or whatever, we take that for our food, and once we catch enough we take it home, that's it, we have our food.

This opposition to being categorized as recreational fishers may also be connected to a lack of recognition of Maori ownership rights, traditional knowledge, or cultural practices in recreational legislation.

As noted above, both hapu groups in the area are in the process of implementing customary regulations. these are contingent on the declaration of a rohe moana, which, for a number of reasons, is proving to be a difficult assignment in practice. Maori property boundaries were historically fluid; hence the present concretizing of territory is inherently antagonistic to traditional practices (ballara 1998). this latent conflict is made explicit by the ability of the general public, commercial and recreational fishers, other hapu and iwi groups, and ultimately the government to contest boundaries. Participants reported that objections had been raised by the general public and other iwi groups to proposed rohe moana territories. the establishment of an ostensibly common property fishing territory is necessary before any tool available under the customary regulations is accessible. this can be a source of frustration: "there are a number of places our old people have already alluded to that need to be taken care of and we can't do that...we're still in limbo because we can't record them until the rohe moana is first set up. We've established them [rohe moana] but it hasn't gone through the stages where it's been approved by the government."

Both hapu have prepared fisheries management plans in anticipation of the customary regulations being established. the preparation of these plans was complicated by the need to comply with the various territorial divisions and the different philosophical agendas of District and regional councils.

We come under rodney District council and Auckland regional council...so its quite hard to get it in place in our case because you're dealing with rodney who's reasonably pro-development, pro-commercial viability, and then on a regional scale we're dealing with the Auckland regional council, which is looking at it in terms of long-term sustainability. so it makes it quite hard because there's two councils at loggerheads. so we've got one wanting to push development, the other one saying "hang on, we need more recreational space" and that recreational space...is in our water spaces, so as soon as they put that recreational space into marine reserves or whatever, for the rest of New Zealand, it impacts on our take.

As noted above, the Fisheries Act, 1996 allows for Maori to temporarily close an area to fishing, thereby giving legal support to customary rahui. traditionally, the imposition of rahui by rangatira (chiefs) was the main overt mechanism for controlling access to marine resources. rahui was imposed on specific stretches of coastline, prohibiting access for certain periods of time. Pou rahui (posts) were erected at the boundaries of the area (best 1977). Normally, rahui was enforced in three types of situations: as a conservation method, when a drowning had occurred, or when a rangatira died. Metge (1989:35) points out that the imposition of rahui also involves a religious dimension: it includes both the recognition of a state of tapu (sacred, holy, forbidden) and the recitation of karakia (prayers) and thus serves a sociopsychological function.

Within Leigh, Maori have imposed at least two rahui in the last five years, both motivated by drowning incidents. the most recent rahui was notified by informing local community groups such as the surf life-saving club and commercial fishermen's organizations directly, and through advertisements in the local newspaper. the Ministry of Fisheries was also contacted and official notification signs were requested. Local residents generally respected the rahui; however, participants were disappointed by the lack of support shown by the Ministry of Fisheries: "the Ministry would not and did not assist us in any way. In fact they wouldn't even tell people that there was a rahui on...they never put the signs up."

Over the last five years no specifically conservational rahui have been implemented in Leigh. this is primarily a consequence of a lack of resources. For instance, the position of kaitiaki, although it entails a substantial amount of work, has no associated funding.

We've talked about it and we've wanted to but at the end of the day if we put that on how are we going to control it? Also who is going to do it? Are those people going to get paid? We've nominated kaitiaki, half a dozen...that's only one step. that's not the complete process... there has to be more involvement than that because of the huge numbers impacting on our area....here, because of our location, we suffer every week...too many people, they just get in the car, drive an hour with their boat up here. We can't monitor that. I just don't think we're able to, we need to be resourced enough to control it.

The concepts of taiapure and mataitai reserves were created specifically for the purposes of customary regulations; though neither of the participant Maori groups had established such reserves. However, this is not unusual as both are relatively rare. For instance, at present there appear to be three taiapure in operation in the North Island and two in the south Island of New Zealand. the 1996 Act, states that "taiapure make better provision for the recognition of rangatiratanga (self-determination, sovereignty) and of the rights secured by article two of the treaty [of Waitangi] as they relate to fishing."7 the Waitangi tribunal8 is less sanguine:

The "better provision" is dependent on Maori conforming with and satisfying a lengthy and onerous statutory process...these processes are time- and resource- intensive. Even if the Minister of Fisheries approves the establishment of the taiapure, Maori do not have rangatiratanga over the fishery. they are but one group represented on a committee of community interests who manage the taiapure collectively. (2004:116)

In addition, the tribunal criticized the lack of official information on the operation of customary fishing tools in practice, noted a very low level of take-up by hapu and "a good deal of complaint about them in Maori quarters" (Waitangi tribunal 2004:116). Further, the legislating of Maori customary fishing practices effectively prohibits Maori from pursuing aboriginal title claims-hence property rights-through the courts (McHugh 1992). Government regulations have appropriated such rights in exchange for "a process over which they [Maori] have little control, and are awarded no funding for their participation" (Waitangi tribunal 2004:116-117). Although participants were ambivalent about the potential benefits of the customary regulations, they nevertheless hoped that they would be superior to regulation 27A under which they currently operate.

The sustainability of the fisheries resource is of fundamental importance to Maori participants. concern was expressed about the growing number of people from outside the area, including other Maori groups, who fish on a recreational basis in Leigh. Further, maritime pursuits other than recreational fishing have become increasingly popular-for instance, diving and jet-skiing-and have put pressure on traditionally harvested resources such as crayfish (spiny lobster) and paua. One consequence of this user intensification is a depletion of inshore fish. this has had a negative impact on Maori fishers who, to a large extent, concentrate on inshore kaimoana. the technology used by Maori in harvesting was and is relatively simple. Due to the decline in inshore kaimoana more sophisticated, and correspondingly more expensive technology, is required.

Local commercial fishers are also sometimes seen as competitors. this is a consequence of rising fuel costs which increases the tendency for such fishers to stay closer to the shore. On the other hand, Maori participants also believe that they have a strong connection with such fishers: "we've always known each other...they have been amongst us for three or four generations." Indeed commercial fishers, as noted above, often catch customary take on behalf of local Maori. ties are further reinforced in marriage, extended by children, and cemented by co-involvement in the same productive activity.

...there's a lot of Pakeha (New Zealand European) families here that won't necessarily be Maori but they've married into our families and they fish too, they're tangata whenua as far as we're concerned...

Maori participants expressed sympathy for the current struggles of local commercial fishers and, in particular, recognized that it is increasingly difficult for such operators to catch customary take on their behalf. "Once upon a time they'd give a bin of fish away to a tangi over at the marae (meeting house) or something, it wasn't a huge loss from their profit margin, but now a couple of bins is quite a substantial amount that they're losing." Nevertheless: "but saying that, I don't think any of the local commercial fishermen would turn us down if we said, 'hey we need a few fish.'" A Maori participant argued that the local fish processing company should now assume this particular harvesting role.

As tangata whenua, Maori participants believe that they should be identified as, at the very least, equal partners in both the ownership and control of the local fisheries resource. A Maori leader astutely commented that as property rights now sit with quota owners, a relationship should be established with decision-makers operating at this level. Further, such private property owners should be held accountable for local resource extraction practices:

Tangata whenua should be talking not just to the commercial fishing guy, who is governed by the market and is only really a middleman, but whom he is employed by, the quota owners. What happens is the quota owners are just selling the quota and the commercial fisherman is under parameters, rules, and regulations. We should be targeting the quota owners and saying "Well, how many boats or how many fishermen do you envisage coming into our rohe moana and getting the quota? When? How often? And how do you want this to work?" rather than them just selling the quota and saying "well, its our quota, we can do what we like with it." that is not always the best outcome.

Recreational Fishers

In international classifications, recreational fishers are not normally included in the category of small-scale producers. this is because their primary objective is assumed to be recreational, as opposed to producing seafood for mass commercial consumption. However, this assumption is somewhat problematic. the recreational sector includes multiple interests which tend to confound simple definitions including those who produce seafood for subsistence purposes; sport hunters motivated by the thrill of the chase and kill; fishers for whom the mere outing, with its camaraderie and bonding, is the most important aspect; and indigenous fishers, among others (Kearney 2001). the total impact of this group on fisheries resources and national economies has long been underestimated (bell 1978). recreational fishing has become an increasingly popular pastime in the developed world and the political influence wielded by this category of fishers is often substantial and may be detrimental to, or at least threaten, the vital interests of small- scale commercial fishers (Kitner 2006, McGoodwin 1990).

Most resident families in Leigh have a minimum of one member who engages in recreational fishing at least once a week and fish are considered an important contribution to the family diet. In addition, fish enter into local reciprocal exchange networks between kin and friends. An important aspect of recreational fishing, consequent upon the open access nature of this category is that it is not confined to locals. rather, an increasing number of people visit Leigh on weekends and during holiday periods to recreationally fish. community members make a sharp distinction between local recreational fishers and "outsiders." this influx of outsiders has coincided with an increase in the number of charter boat operators. such ventures accommodate up to 30 recreational fishers (mainly those from outside the community) at any one time. As a result of these and other developments, a number of research participants claimed that, "Auckland [the nearest city] is getting closer." A participant elaborated: "Five years ago we knew everyone in Leigh...It was a nice little village and most of the people were involved in fishing but most of them come from elsewhere now." Participants nevertheless insisted that Leigh was still primarily a fishing community.

Recreational fishers in Leigh tend to describe the most intense competition as coming from "outside" recreational fishers who need "policing and education." this prescription is also directed at the alleged illegal activities of "outside" commercial netters, whom, it is claimed, drag for snapper and scallop at night-time. A participant complained, "What's left for the recreational fisherman?" One recreational fisher who had lived in Leigh for 30 years, recalled:

The fish are smaller now. If I got a 20 pounder I'd be really happy but 15-20 years ago you could go out and when you were allowed 30 snapper, you'd get 30 snapper and they were all 20 pounds, now you're only allowed nine, which I think is a good idea, but then you've got to try and get nine fish and it's really hard. I think with the amount of petrol my boat uses, it would be cheaper for me to go and get a feed from the shop and that's going to cost me $30 for a fillet.

Internal tensions are centered around "too many little boats doing commercial fishing close to Leigh," and competition for wharf space. A participant argued, "Leigh needs a bigger wharf, perhaps a separate wharf for recreational fishers. there are 30 moorings at Leigh wharf." However, recreational fishers were essentially sympathetic to the changing circumstances of local commercial fishers, believing their present hardship to have originated in forces fundamentally outside of their control: "there is no money in commercial fishing so if you run a small boat close to shore your expenditures are less." the current struggles of commercial fishers were linked by participants to global processes in general, and the QMs in particular, both of which were seen to favor free-market forces over and above local concerns. In robert's conception, Leigh commercial fishers were being "shafted" by big business opportunists:

The problem is with fisheries companies who are leasing quotas, they are shafting the small-scale commercial fishers. Quota owners have all the money. the companies are businessmen and they are leasing back quotas to commercial fishers and leasing is the only viable way, as commercial fishers can't afford to own quota.

Theory, Practice, and Ideology in Fishery Management

Fisheries regulations in New Zealand encompass divergent property ideologies and theories: the commercial regulations stem from the creation of private property, the customary regulations are rooted in conceptions of common property, and to an important degree the recreational regulations mimic open access regimes. Each of these may be seen as an ideal type in that they are never totally realized in practice, although at certain historical junctures, one property type may be highly favored in management practices and legislation (benda-beckmann et al. 2006). this has been the case over the last generation in New Zealand where the imposition of a robust form of neoliberalism has attempted to marginalize alternative methods of organizing fishing activity. However, this attempt has not been wholly successful. In Leigh, on the level of local practice, the various fishing types struggle to co-exist and appear to defy watertight codification. Further, many observers have contested the assumptions upon which the legislation is based and point to the social consequences of privatizing fisheries along with the inconsistencies between aims and outcomes.

The debate between supporters and detractors of QMs approaches as a tool to manage fisheries, can be understood as rooted in the opposition between proponents of neoclassical economic and rationalization theories and social scientists who typically emphasize the often deleterious social costs of privatization (see carothers 2008, Helgason and Palsson 1997, Mccay 2008). However, the debate is more complex than this model suggests. the rationale for implementing quota systems is commonly couched in terms of sustainable management, a somewhat loose concept with broad appeal. the debate on sustainability is frequently inconclusive because of the absence of a commonly accepted definition. Arguably, the definition of sustainability informing the New Zealand QMs focuses on a restricted notion of biological sustainability and a narrow interpretation of economic efficiency, to the exclusion of social concerns (Gibbs 2008). Of the 633 stocks in the QMs, stock status relative to management target is known for 119 stock (Ministry for the Environment 2010). Of the 119 stocks, 69 percent were considered to be at or above the management target in 2010. 31 percent were considered to be below the target, up from 15 percent in 2006 and 2007 (Ministry for the Environment 2010). the sustainability of the QMs is contested (see Gibbs 2008, Wallace, 1998). It is by no means clear that the QMs approach does indeed lead to increased sustainability as predicted (clark, Major, and Mollett 1998; stewart, Walshe, and Moodie 2005). After over two decades of the QMs, a number of fisheries in New Zealand remain at very low stock levels, little stock enhancement is evident, and species such as hoki (blue grenadier/blue hake) may be in an effectively worse condition (Gibbs 2008). the QMs regime is fundamentally a single species approach to fisheries management and thus inherently conflicts with broader ecosystem-based approaches. Dumping or high-grading (getting rid of less valuable or damaged fish from a vessel's catch at sea) are virtually inevitable outcomes of quota-managed fisheries (Gibbs 2008). tietenberg (2002, 2007) states that evidence on the environmental consequences of ItQ systems is mixed.

The alleged superiority of the QMs system for conserving stocks is rooted in the belief that individual property right holders of ItQs must protect their valuable ItQs and thus will have a superior incentive to promote conservation in comparison to fishers operating under alternative ownership regimes (Gibbs 2008). the economist copes (2000:4) contests this supposition and argues that commercial fishers have motivations other than the market value of their assets and, besides, have to conform to socially-rooted prevailing conservation practices. Nor has it been demonstrated that tradable permit regimes outperform common property regimes in this respect (see, for instance, rose 2002). In addition, some researchers in New Zealand have pointed to the adverse consequences of QMs approaches such as quota consolidation with the result that the five largest companies now control 85 to 90 percent of quota (Dewees 2008:50), the vertical integration of harvesters and processors (bess 2006), the removal of over 3000 fishers (stewart et al. 2006), a substantial decline in the number of small owner-operator vessels, and a significant transfer of ownership to non-fishers. based on the historically naïve notion that economic and social activities inhabit distinct and compartmentalized domains, neoliberalism tends to ignore the social consequences of the one-sided pursuit of economic efficiency. carothers' (2008) research in remote Alaskan coastal villages of the Kodiak Archipelago emphasizes the social fissures that emerge as a result of the privatization of fisheries access. such policies "have constrained flexible kin-based fishing economies and have caused disproportionate reductions in fisheries participation... the emergence of a lost generation...[and] place-based collective fishing lifestyles are being replaced by individual private fishing rights for the elite" (2008:55). similar consequences have been substantially visited on the small-scale commercial fishers in Leigh.

Participant commercial fishers typically viewed quota consolidation (and with it wealth accumulation) as highly problematic and attempted to question this development by employing a discourse rooted in a moral evaluation of this process. Large companies, for instance, were seen to be unfairly advantaged due to their relative wealth and ability to access investment funds. It was envisioned that consolidation would eventually lead to the phasing out of the autonomy of small-scale fishers as well as community-based companies and create an unchallengeable monopoly. Further, large companies were seen to have little interest in local community issues or the sustainable management of fisheries, since they were primarily motivated by the search for profit. A similar discourse is reported among Icelandic fishers (Helgason and Palsson 1997). A moral discourse was also employed in connection with the ownership of quota by non- fishers. this tended to contrast private ownership by non-fishers with the common rights of fishers, a discourse rooted in the grand opposing paradigms of private versus communal ownership and market versus moral economies. In this perspective private ownership and market behavior are seen as "morally obscene" and the quota system is perceived as a method by which "the rich get richer." this discourse also attributes a superior environmental conscientiousness and practice to fishers vis-à-vis non-fishing private owners; a rhetoric severely at odds with the presumed sustainable management generating ethos of the QMs.

At the most general level, local commercial fishers appeal to tradition, continuity in genealogical time, affiliation with place, and specialized knowledge and practice in response to perceived threats from "outside" recreational fishers, conservationists, imposed management regimes, and the modernization and globalization of the industry. Minnegal, King, Just, and Dywer (2003) found a similar appeal to tradition among fishers living in coastal communities of Victoria, Australia. the authors argue that at first this appeal appears somewhat paradoxical, given that most established fishers in Victoria "are first or second generation members of an industry that, through its 150 year history, has been characterized by innovation and mobility" (2003:53). However, they assert that this paradox is more artificial than real. "Fisher identity is grounded primarily in engagement with an environment that is not familiar to outsiders. the paradox arises because fishers, like others who seek to sustain a future in the face of threat from outsiders, reshape strongly felt identity as tradition" (2003:53). In this reshaping, an environmental consciousness becomes an important mobilizing force through which an attachment to place is expressed. this rhetoric, by stressing the centrality of both identification with and the protection of the local resource base, mimics to a large degree the discourse of indigeneity.

Conclusion

For commercial fishers the introduction of the new property regime directly transformed social relations of production and brought new types of inequalities. small-scale fishers, among whom the Maori figured prominently, have substantially been removed from commercial fishing. the productive roles of the remaining fishers have largely been converted from those of relatively autonomous small-scale producers to those of wage-laborers. such changes have created a substantial rupture in daily life and work, in the cultural practices that have grown up around fishing, and in the ability of fishers to reproduce their way of life. the social reproduction of small-scale producers often rests on the involvement of kin in the production process, for instance, the wives and partners of participant commercial fishers characteristically take charge of bookwork, a complex task given the heavy compliance demands of the QMs regime. However, these roles are being progressively undermined by the need for such family members to seek additional paid work in order to compensate for the declining returns from fishing. Fishers also spoke of their former hope that their children would follow in their footsteps and their intense distress that this process, previously conceived of as natural, is now unlikely if not ill advised:

...I'd love to send him to sea because I can see it's in him as well because that's what he's been around.

Both my sons want to fish...we've [commercial fishers] all said the same thing, get a land based career and then go to sea if you have to, get it out of your system, get something behind you first because you're probably going to need it to turn back on.

Research in New Zealand on the ItQs' socio-economic impact on communities is limited,9 however, the research that is available suggests that Leigh is not atypical. Mcclintock, baines, and taylor (2000) identify ten small fishing communities in New Zealand (including Leigh), focusing on three such communities in the south Island: riverton, Moeraki, and Havelock. their findings indicate that many aspects of the QMs favor major companies at the expense of small operators. consequently, small- scale fishers are increasingly unemployed, have shifted careers, or have moved away. the small-scale fishers that remain are experiencing decreasing returns, fewer younger fishers are entering the industry, comprehensive local knowledge of fishing and conservational practices has been devalued, and communities are attempting, somewhat desperately, to expand their marine based activities to include such ventures as commercial aquaculture, increased charter boat operations, and a tourist market.

For customary fishers, production for exchange (either market or reciprocal) has been criminalized and fishers are restricted to production for narrowly defined ceremonial occasions. customary regulations purportedly represent traditional sustainable management practices; however, this is contestable given that the two main tools, taiapure and mataitai reserves, signify an official invention of Maori tradition and that the traditional resource management tool used by Maori, rahui, often lacks formal recognition. Further, the common property aspect of these regulations is subverted in serious ways: firstly, by a lack of power to exclude and regulate; and secondly, the absence of funding to guarantee the realization and maintenance of common property institutions made possible under the new regulations.

For recreational fishers, a relative lack of legislative restrictions coupled with the open-access characteristic of the governing property regime implies that a certain amount of maneuverability is possible. However, a distinction has to be made between local recreational fishers, many of whom are in reality subsistence fishers, and those fishers, mostly outsiders, who practice recreational fishing as a leisure activity or hobby.

Given these tensions, it is perhaps surprising to find a level of solidarity among fishers in Leigh that seems to transcend the constraints imposed by regulations, user categories, and competition over resource use. Perhaps, as benda-beckmann et al. (2006) point out, in everyday behaviors, property rights and legal rules may be less important than locally embedded social relations and conceptions of ownership. Dewees' (2008:50) research in Nelson and Golden bay on the south Island of New Zealand, likewise indicates that a relative lack of conflict exists between the three fishing categories. He suggests that this may be a consequence of the local history of shared fisheries management in the scallop fishery in addition to the more rural setting of the communities. In Leigh, two countervailing tendencies can be identified which operate to keep potential conflicts in check at the local and community level. First, what tends to happen is that the tensions are redirected to a different level occupied by those quota owners who are non-participants in fishing, fisheries managers and officers whose expertise is challenged by the current and historical experiences of fishers and outside fishers whose presence obstructs any local attempt to claim the resource as a common property regime. second, there is an underlying community of interest which is both expressed in and emerges from a number practices. For instance, a local fisher may, over time, cross the boundaries between the different categories and catch fish under all three legislative regimes. thus in concrete practice, the boundaries may be perceived by local fishers as arbitrary and subject to manipulation. Further, opposition to the encroachment of the global economy-represented in particular by the QMs and increased tourism-has encouraged a level of community solidarity. Perhaps, however, the greatest source of cohesion emerges from co-participation in the productive activity of fishing itself. this to some extent sets fishers apart from non-fishers and reduces the tensions arising from any particular divisive issue, a sentiment expressed most strikingly by a Maori participant as quoted earlier, and worth repeating here:

there's a lot of Pakeha (New Zealand European) families here that won't necessarily be Maori but they've married into our families and they fish too, they're tangata whenua as far as we're concerned. n

Endnotes

1Annual catch Entitlements (AcE) are assigned to quota holders based on the share of total quota they hold and the total Allowable commercial catch (tAcc). Once the tAcc for a given year has been decided, the kilogram equivalent of each quota share is calculated. this is transferred at the beginning of the fishing year as AcE to the quota owner and determines the tonnage of fish that the owner is able to catch (or alternatively sell or hold) within the fishing year.

2the treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840, consists of three articles and records an agreement between the Maori and the british crown. It provides the crown with rights to govern and to continue settling the country with british immigrants. the crown guaranteed the Maori full protection of and tribal authority over their lands, fisheries, forests, villages, culture, and treasures, and extends to the Maori the full status and rights of british citizenship.

3Fieldwork was supported by the Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand and charles crothers, AUt Univeristy, helped with statistical information. this analysis, however, is the author's own and does not represent either the analysis of the Ministry of Fisheries or their position.

4total percentages add up to more than 100 as people can identify with more than one ethnic group.

5Leigh Fisheries has subsidiaries in America (Lee Fish UsA) and Europe (Lee Fish Europe) as well as Lee Lobster, which exports crayfish. the company additionally has a subsidiary company with sealord, Flying seafoods, which services the United Kingdom.

6the total value of quota in New Zealand is estimated at $3.5 billion.

7Article II confirms the protection of Maori chiefs and their authority over their land, forests, fisheries, and other properties.

8the Waitangi tribunal investigates crown breaches of the treaty of Waitangi, including claims brought by Maori against any Act, policy, action, or omission that affects them in a negative way. the tribunal conducts hearings, produces written reports, and makes recommendations to the Government.

9Notable exceptions include Dewees 2008; stewart, Walshe, and Moodie 2006; Mcclintock, baines, and taylor 2000; and Yandle 2007.

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Author affiliation:

Fiona McCormack

University of Hawaii